• Bar-On, Dorit. “Crude Meaning, Brute Thought.” Forthcoming in Journal for the History of Analytic Philosophy (special issue).
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Drew Johnson. “Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.” Forthcoming in New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, edited by Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn, and Duncan Pritchard. Oxford University Press.
• Difranco, Ralph, and Andrew Morgan. “You shouldn’t have laughed! The ethics of derogatory amusement.” Forthcoming in The Moral Psychology of Amusement, edited by Brian Robinson. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Jordan Ochs. “The Role of Inner Speech in Self-Knowledge: Against Neo-Rylean Views.” Teorema 37, no. 1 (2018): 5-22.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Minding the Gap: In Defense of Mind-mind Continuity.” In Wittgenstein and Naturalism, edited by Kevin M. Cahill and Thomas Raleigh, 177-203. New York: Routledge, 2018.
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Richard Moore. “Pragmatic Interpretation and Signaler-Receiver Asymmetries in Animal Communication.” In The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Kristen Andrews and Jacob Beck, 291-300. New York: Routledge, 2018.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Gricean Intentions, Expressive Communication, and Origins of Meaning.” In The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Kristen Andrews and Jacob Beck, 301-312. New York: Routledge, 2018.
• Botero, Marie. “Bringing Touch Back to the Study of Emotions in Human and Non-Human Primates: A Theoretical Exploration.” International Journal of Comparative Psychology 31, 2018. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4qf475c2.
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Kate Nolfi. “Belief Self-Knowledge.” Oxford Handbook Online, 2016.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Sociality, Expression, and This Thing Called Language.” Inquiry 59, no. 1 (2016): 56-79.
• Bar-On, Dorit, and James Sias. “Emotions and Their Expressions.” In The Expression of Emotion: Philosophical, Psychological, and Legal Perspectives, edited by Catharine Abell and Joel Smith, 46-72. Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Transparency, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 2 (2015): 134-152.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Expression: Acts, Products, and Meaning.”  In Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, edited by Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, 180-209. Oxford University Press, 2015. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit, Matthew Chrisman, and James Sias. “(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?” In Having it Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics, edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, 223-247. Oxford University Press, 2014.
• Bar-On, Dorit, and James Sias. “Varieties of Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 8 (2013): 699-713.
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Expressive Communication and Continuity Skepticism.” Journal of Philosophy 110, no. 6 (2013): 293-330. [pdf] (undergraduate RA: Kevin Richardson)
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Origins of Meaning: Must We ‘Go Gricean’?” Mind & Language 28, no. 3 (2013): 342-375. [pdf] (RA: Matthew Priselac)
• Bar-On, Dorit. (2012). “Expression, Truth, and Reality: Some Variations on Themes from Wright.” In Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 162-194. Oxford University Press, 2012. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Matthew Priselac. “Triangulation and the Beasts.” In Triangulation: from an Epistemological Point of View, edited by Maria Cristina Amoretti and Gerhard Preyer, 121-152. Ontos Verlag, 2011. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Expressing as ‘Showing What’s Within’.” Philosophical Books 51, no. 4 (2010): 212–227. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Green, Mitch. “Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning.” In Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg: in Memory of Jay F. Rosenberg, edited by James R. O’Seah and Eric Rubenstein, 89-106. Ridgeview Publishing Co., 2010. [pdf] (RA: Matthew Priselac)

• Bar-On, Dorit and Kate Arnold. “How To Do Things With Nonwords: Communication, Expression, and Meaning.”
• Bar-On, Dorit. “Expressing and Believing.”
• Bar-On, Dorit. “No ‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge.”
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Matthew Priselac. “Origins: Subjective, Objective, Intersubjective.”  
• Difranco, Ralph, and Andrew Morgan. “No Harm, Still Foul: A Deontic Account of the Wrongness of Slurring.”
• Difranco, Ralph, and Andrew Morgan. “Slurs, Speech Acts, and Derogatory Soliloquies.”
• Difranco, Ralph, and Andrew Morgan. “When Derogatory Language Goes Viral.”
• Johnson, Drew. “Lies and Hypocrisy: Hybrid Illocutionary Acts in Ethical Thought and Discourse.”
• Tanaka, Ryo. “Rule-Following and Basic Semantic Knowledge.”

Here are some papers written on these topics before the creation of the ECOM:

• Bar-On, Dorit. “Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.” In Self-Knowledge and the Self, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 189-211. Oxford University Press, 2o11. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Matthew Chrisman. “Ethical Neo-Expressivism.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. V (2009): 132-165. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit. “First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.” Erkenntnis 71, no. 1 (2009): 53-71. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit. “‘Meaning’ Reconstructed: Grice and the Naturalization of Semantics.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1995): 83-116. [pdf]
• Bar-On, Dorit. “On the Possibility of a Solitary Language.” Nous 26 (1992): 27-46. [pdf]